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Abstract
Modern institutions face the recurring dilemma of designing accurate evaluation procedures in settings as diverse as
academic selection committees, social policies, elections, and figure skating competitions. In particular, it is essential to
determine both the number of evaluators and the method for combining their judgments. Previous work has focused on
the latter issue, uncovering paradoxes that underscore the inherent difficulties. Yet the number of judges is an important
consideration that is intimately connected with the methodology and the success of the evaluation. We address the
question of the number of judges through a cost analysis that incorporates the accuracy of the evaluation method, the cost
per judge, and the cost of an error in decision. We associate the optimal number of judges with the lowest cost and
determine the optimal number of judges in several different scenarios. Through analytical and numerical studies, we show
how the optimal number depends on the evaluation rule, the accuracy of the judges, the (cost per judge)/(cost per error)
ratio. Paradoxically, we find that for a panel of judges of equal accuracy, the optimal panel size may be greater for judges
with higher accuracy than for judges with lower accuracy. The development of any evaluation procedure requires
knowledge about the accuracy of evaluation methods, the costs of judges, and the costs of errors. By determining the
optimal number of judges, we highlight important connections between these quantities and uncover a paradox that we
show to be a general feature of evaluation procedures. Ultimately, our work provides policy-makers with a simple and novel
method to optimize evaluation procedures.
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Introduction
Ever since the late 18th century, when Nicolas de Condorcet
identified problems and paradoxes that arise when combining the
opinions of independent judges [1], it has been clear that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to establish evaluation procedures that
result in fair and accurate decisions [2–4]. Yet, evaluation is at the
heart of many societal procedures including: governmental
decisions [5–8], peer-reviewed processes [9–19], and athletic
competitions [20–22]. The recent revisions of evaluation proce-
dures in areas as diverse as figure skating [21,22] and NIH grant
review [9–13] underscore both the inherent difficulties and the
perceived importance of developing optimal methods.
In this article we do not examine the history of these issues nor
discuss the extensive social science research concerning psycho-
logical and group dynamic aspects of decision processes [23–25].
Nor do we consider the well-studied problem of how to combine
the evaluations of a panel of judges [2,4–6,8,26–31]. Rather, we
consider an important issue in the design of any evaluation
procedure: how many judges should be used?
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that if judges are equally
accurate, perform better than random selection, and make
decisions according to majority rule then increasing the number
of judges will always result in more accurate evaluations [1].
Accuracy, however, cannot be the only criterion for designing an
evaluation procedure. For example, if a scientific journal needs to
determine whether a paper should be published then consulting a
large number of reviewers is not practical, even if it could lead to
more accurate decisions. So despite the importance of accuracy,
there is also an issue of cost whether in time or money or both.
We distinguish between two types of costs: the cost of a wrong
decision and the cost of a judge. If all options were equally
valuable then there would be no reason to consult any judges. The
use of an evaluation procedure, therefore, must assume that there
is at least one option better or ‘‘correct’’ among the choices. In this
context, picking an inferior option incurs some type of cost
whether it is lost revenue or greater risk to financial loss. Although
it may be difficult to determine the ‘‘correct’’ choice(s) or the
precise costs, societal institutions make major efforts to set
evaluation procedures. Difficulty in determining whether the
outcome was the best possible should not preclude examination of
the relevant factors at the heart of all evaluation procedures. While
it is beneficial to avoid a costly mistake, judges also have associated
costs in the form of expenses or salaries. The optimal number of
judges must balance these costs, weighing the benefit of additional
judges against their cost.
Previous studies have mainly addressed the question of how best
to select among competing options using a set number of judges
[2,4–6,8,26–31]. Though there has also been some consideration
of the accuracy and cost of an evaluation procedure as a function
of the number of judges [9,15,32–34], these earlier papers did not
explicitly consider the cost of making a wrong decision in their
calculations of the optimal number of judges. The cost of an error
is important because it converts the accuracy of an evaluation into
a currency comparable to the cost of judges. Here, we examine
how the optimal number of judges depends on the accuracy of the
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combining the judges’ scores.
Throughout the paper, we assume that judges are honest but
prone to error. In this case, we can define a judge’s accuracy as the
expected probability that an individual judge will choose the correct
option (see File S1 for a glossary of additional key terms). This
definition of accuracy may be case-specific and subject to other
qualifications but there has been work in estimating judge accuracy
in complex scenarios such as grant review [14–16,19]. Some
evaluation procedures such as Cooke’s method attempt to estimate
judge accuracy with seed questions as partofthe procedure [26–28].
If we have some measure of judge accuracy and know the rules
for combining the evaluations of the judges, we can compute a
curve that gives the probability of making a correct decision as a
function of the number of judges: the judge accuracy curve. The judge
accuracy curve can be computed using many different models of
evaluations including ones in which judges are unequal, non-
human, or reach decisions under influence from other judges.
With the judge accuracy curve, the cost per judge, and the cost per
error, we can compute the cost curve, which represents the expected
cost as a function of the number of judges. The number of judges
at the minimum of the cost curve is defined as the optimal number
of judges. For a given method of evaluation, at the optimal
number of judges there is an implied relationship between the
accuracy of the evaluation, the number of judges, and the ratio
between the cost of an error and the cost per judge. Knowing any
two of these quantities, allows us to estimate the third.
Based on our formulation we present a paradox. From the work
of Condorcet, it might appear that if the accuracy of judges were
improved, then the optimal number of judges should decrease.
However, we show examples in which as the accuracy of the
judges increases, the optimal number of judges may also increase.
In the remainder of this paper we illustrate each of these points
and present some practical implications of these results.
Results
To balance cost and accuracy, we represent the expected total
cost of an evaluation (Ctot)a s
Ctot~njudge CjudgezCerror Perror(njudge), ð1Þ
where, Cjudge is the cost per judge, Cerror is the cost of making an
incorrect decision, njudge is the number of judges, and Perror is the
probability of making an error. Perror is a function of the number
of judges and is equal to (1{panel accuracy), where panel
accuracy is the probability a set of judges picks the better option.
In practice Perror depends on many other factors but we hold these
constant here. By taking a difference approximation of the
derivative in Eq. (1), the optimal number of judges will occur when
DPerror
Dnjudge
~{
Cjudge
Cerror
ð2Þ
where DPerror=Dnjudge is the rate of change in Perror as a function of
the change in the number of judges. In order to determine the
optimal number of judges for particular situations, we first consider
how Perror depends of the number of judges for the two most
common evaluation methods: majority rule and scoring systems.
Majority Rule
In majority rule the option favored by the most judges is the
winner. When the majority rule is used in a series of decisions like
rank-ordering options, the well-known Voter’s paradox can occur,
so that there is no clear winner (Figure 1A) [3–6,8,20,23–25].
Since majority rule gives an equal weighting to all judges, it does
not make allowances for differences in judge confidence or
accuracy [35,36] – giving more weight to more accurate judges
would improve the accuracy of the evaluation [27]. The
Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that for equally accurate judges
the judge accuracy curve monotonically increases as the number of
judges increase. However, in practice the most accurate judges are
consulted first.
To assess the effects of adding inferior judges to the judge
accuracy curve, we suppose there is a panel of three judges
deciding between two options A and B, where A is better than B. If
there are 3 judges, each with 80% accuracy who make decisions
independently by a majority rule, then their collective accuracy or
the ‘‘panel’s accuracy’’ is 89.6%. If we now add additional
evaluators with 70% accuracy then the probability of making a
correct decision increases even though the judges are inferior. If
instead we add evaluators with 60% accuracy, the probability of a
correct judgment decreases and does not increase until we add 22
judges, see Figure 1B (see Methods: Judge Accuracy Curve with
Inferior Judges). These observations are consistent with earlier
studies that showed that additional judges can increase or decrease
a panel’s accuracy depending on the accuracy of the individual
judges and the number already in the panel [32–34]. Thus, judge
accuracy curves need not be monotonic. This permits the
possibility for multiple values of the optimal number of judges
where the same expected total cost could be achieved with
different numbers of judges and different accuracies of the
evaluation.
Scoring Systems
In contrast to the majority rule, scoring systems, such as those used
in figure skating [22] are procedures in which judges assign
numerical ratings, or scores, to competing options. The winner is
often chosen by the sum rule whereby the option with the highest
sum of scores wins. The sum rule can reach different conclusions
than the majority rule (Figure 2A). Based on the distribution of
scores in the US Junior Figure Skating Championship 2006
(Figure 2B, data available at http://www.usfigureskating.org), we
simulate an evaluation and find that the sum rule is more accurate
than the majority rule (Figure 2C and Methods: Sum Rule vs
Majority Rule Methods). This finding supports the International
Skating Union’s switch from a majority rule-based system in 2002
to a sum rule-based system in 2006 [21,22]. The sum rule enables
judges’ scores to reflect their certainty – so that a judge who scores
two options with a 6.0 and a 9.0, respectively expresses more
confidence than a judge who scores the same two options with a
6.0 and a 6.1, respectively. Adding the judges’ scores gives the
judges who assign larger score differences between options more
power in determining the final evaluation. This can make scoring
systems susceptible to manipulation by dishonest judges [2].
Although the example of Figure 2C shows a case in which a
scoring system is more accurate than majority rule, the situation can
reverse in instances where the judges’ scores are widely distributed.
An example of this is in gene microarray analysis [37,38]. Genetic
microarrays measure the expression of thousands of genes
simultaneously using DNA probes. Each gene’s mRNA transcript
has a set of probes designed to bind it specifically in different
regions. Samples of mRNA are labelled so that the amount bound
to each probe on the microarray can be measured. Here, the probes
are judges and the fluorescent intensities are scores. Applying the
sum rule in this case is analogous to comparing means, except the
sum rule does not consider the standard deviation nor calculate a
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magnitudes from the probes are broadly distributed (Figure 2D,
data available at http://www.affymetrix.com/support/technical/
sample_data/datasets.affx) unlike the tight distributions found in
figure skating. Now the sum rule is not as accurate as a majority rule
(Figure 2E) because each judge/probe is scoring according to a
different rubric, i.e. the same score difference does not represent the
same degree of confidence.
The distribution of the judges’ scores affects the accuracy of the
evaluation. In evaluations using scoring systems, guidelines are
often used to ensure that the range of each evaluators’ scores will
be comparable. When that is not possible, as for microarrays,
where the distribution of fluorescent intensities of individual
probes is approximately lognormally distributed, it is common to
first take the logarithm of the probe intensity before further
statistical analysis [38,39]. Hence, even with the same decision
method (the sum rule) and the same judge accuracies the
implementation of evaluation procedures such as the permitted
scores can alter the judge accuracy curve.
Paradox
Based on the preceding analysis of the judge accuracy curve, we
return to the cost analysis. Equation 2 shows that if we know the
ratio between the cost per judge and the cost per error we can
calculate the optimal number of judges for particular evaluations.
For example, if we assume the cost per error is 55 times the cost
per judge and use the Perror from Figure 2E we obtain Figure 3A.
The expected total cost has a minimum at either 5 or 7 judges
depending on the evaluation method and the accuracy of the
judges.
Figure 3A presents a paradox: the optimal number of judges
may increase despite the use of more accurate judges or more
accurate evaluation methods. Even though the majority rule with
judges 70% accurate is more accurate than both a sum rule with
70% accurate judges and a majority rule with 65% accurate
judges, it has a minimum cost at 7 judges while the latter
procedures have a minimum cost at 5 judges. This counterintuitive
effect occurs because the judge accuracy curve for the majority
rule with 70% accurate judges (see Figure 2E) has a larger slope
Figure 1. Condorcet results. (A) Voter’s paradox. A hypothetical ranking of 5 competitors evaluated by 5 judges, where 1 is most preferred and 5 is
least. By comparing options two at a time with majority rule, we produce a directed graph. The nodes are the competitors and the edges stemming
from a node indicate which competitors that node beat. For example, the edge from B to A represents more judges favored B to A. The cycle through
all of the nodes is indicative of the Voter’s paradox (3): no clear winner. (B) The Condorcet Jury Theorem. Given a panel of 3 judges of 80% accuracy,
we show the effects of adding judges with accuracy of 60% (red), 70% (blue), 80% (green) on the group’s accuracy (panel accuracy) under majority
rule. According to the Condorcet Jury Theorem if all judges have the same accuracy (green), then adding more judges increases the panel’s accuracy.
However, if the judges have a lower accuracy, the judge accuracy curve is not necessarily monotonic. The 60% accurate judges initially detract from
the panel’s accuracy and do not improve it until 22 judges are added (25 total in the panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012642.g001
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adding two additional judges reduces the probability of an error,
and hence the expected cost, enough to offset the cost of the extra
judges.
Since the optimal number of judges depends on the cost ratio
(Cerror=Cjudge), the paradox also depends on the relationship
between the costs. Figure 3B shows that as the cost ratio increases
the optimal number of judges increases divergently for majority
rule procedures with 65% and 70% accurate judges. There are
three ranges of the cost ratio where the majority rule with more
accurate judges has a higher optimal number of judges. Once the
cost ratio increases above 60, the more accurate procedure never
has a higher optimal judge number.
The contours in Figure 3C denote the optimal number of judges
of a majority rule evaluation as a function of judge accuracy and
the cost ratio (Cerror=Cjudge). For small cost ratios, (Cerror=
Cjudge)v&23, there is never an optimal panel size greater than
one, because the cost of the judges outweighs the benefit of
avoiding an incorrect decision. As the cost ratio increases so does
the value of additional judges. For any optimal panel size of more
than one judge, at the same cost ratio there are smaller optimal
panels of both less accurate and more accurate judges.
Although Figure 3C was computed for a very specific evaluation
procedure, we expect similar contour plots to occur over a broad
range of evaluation procedures (see also File S1 and Figure S1). If
the accuracy of each judge is no better than random selection or if
the accuracy is 100% then the most cost effective strategy is to use
only one judge. These two conditions define the boundaries on the
contour plot and guarantee the generality of the paradox, even for
a host of different evaluation settings.
Figure 2. Majority rule versus sum rule. (A) The score-sheets for two competitors in the 2006 US Junior Figure Skating Championship show that
while only 3 of the 9 judges (shaded) preferred Competitor KW, she has the higher total score. (B) The histograms show the frequency of scores for
skaters ranked 1–5 (red) and those ranked 6–10 (blue). (C) Judge accuracy curves of the sum rule (red) and the majority rule (blue) on a hypothetical
problem based on B with judges that are 70% accurate (see Methods). The sum rule is more accurate than the majority rule (confirmed by a
nonparametric sign test, p-valuev.01 for all cases of more than one judge). (D) The distributions of probe intensities from the Affymetrix Latin
Squares data-set measuring 64 picomolar (blue) and 128 picomolar (red) transcripts are very broad. (E) Judge accuracy curves on a model based on D
(see Methods) where the judges’ scores come from a wide scoring distribution. The majority rule of judges 70% accurate (blue) outperforms the sum
rule of 70% accurate judges (red). In fact a majority rule of judges at 65% accuracy (green) does better than the sum rule of 70% accurate judges as
the number of judges increases beyond 21. A nonparametric sign test confirms the differences in performance (p-valuev.01) for all cases of more
than one judge.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012642.g002
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From the findings presented in Figure 3, there is an implied
relationship between the cost ratio, the number of judges, and the
accuracy of the evaluation. If we know any two of them, we can
calculate a range for the third. To illustrate this, we consider
different paradigmatic situations from athletic competitions and
from academic grant review.
Athletic competitions. First, we apply our analysis to figure
skating and infer the cost ratio from the number of judges and the
expected accuracy of the evaluation. We estimate judge accuracy
by assuming each judge is equally accurate and then counting the
times a judge failed to give the stage’s top competitor the highest
score. While individual judges may have different accuracies,
figure skating competitions occur in many different places with
different collections of judges so such averaging approaches might
be more appropriate to establish standards for evaluation
procedures. From the results of the 2006 US Junior Figure
Skating Championship, we calculate an individual judge’s
accuracy as 76%. This serves as an upper limit to the accuracy
since it assumes the number one competitor was in fact the best. If
the competition choice of nine judges is optimal, the implied ratio
of cost of an error to cost of a judge is 100–152.
Now we use a similar approach to estimate the cost per judge in
boxing bouts and compare with actual salaries. World Boxing
Association bouts are scored by three judges. If the fight ends by
knockout or is stopped by the referee then the scores are not used.
If, however, the fight continues to the last bell then the judges’
scores determine the winner. The scores are not added but instead
count as a vote, so if two judges score one competitor higher that
competitor wins regardless of the values of the scores. From this,
we estimate a judge’s accuracy as was done for the figure skating
example. We counted how often a judge disagreed with the
majority decision in 2006 (found at http://wbaonline.com) and
calculated an accuracy of 95%. We set the cost of an error equal to
the prize since the wrong person gets it. In boxing the actual cost
of an error might reflect the displeasure of the fans and lost
revenue as well as any legal ramifications. The prize varies
depending on many factors, but for this analysis we set the prize to
$100,000. Assuming three judges is optimal, we use the cost
equation to calculate the range for a judge’s salary as $ 305–$
Figure 3. The paradox of the optimal number of judges. (A) The expected cost function (Equation 1) applied to the judge accuracy curve
shown in Figure 2E. The cost per error is 55 times the cost per judge. The black line is the sum rule with 70% accurate judges, while the gray lines are
majority rule (solid for 70% accurate judges and dashed for 65% accurate judges). The optimal number of judges, shown with the bigger dot, is
different for the majority rule with 70% accurate judges. (B) The optimal number of judges as a function of the cost ratio. The majority rule with 70%
accurate judges (red) and 65% accurate judges (blue) both increase the optimal number of judges as the cost ratio increases but diverge at points. (C)
Contour plot of the optimal number of judges for majority rule as a function of the cost ratio and the judge accuracy. The reds indicate higher
number of judges while the blues indicate lower numbers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012642.g003
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paid in a bout with a $100,000 purse (found at http://wbanews.
com/artman/publish/regulations). The International Boxing Or-
ganization changes the fees paid to judges based on the purse
(from http://www.iboboxing.com /public_disclosures.html). For
prizes worth $100,000 judges get paid $1,200 which is in
agreement with our calculated range. For prizes worth a million
dollars, judges get paid $2,000, but using our analysis we calculate
that the optimal number of judges would be 5 and not 3,
suggesting that the procedure is not optimal.
Grant Review. Assuming a hypothetical situation that
corresponds roughly to current norms of grant reviews, we
estimate a reviewer’s accuracy based on the costs and number of
reviewers. To estimate the cost per judge, we calculate the cost per
judge per review. We assume that a committee reviews 50 grants
in two days. Assuming $1,000 in travel expenses per judge, we
obtain a cost of 20 dollars per grant/per judge.
It is difficult to estimate the cost of an error in awarding research
grants [16,18,19]. While publications may be a quantifiable
measure there are issues concerning the quality of the publication,
therole ofcoauthors,andthelong rangeimpactofthework[16,19].
Although the cost of an error in grant reviews may be troublesome
to exactly quantify, policy-makers are interested in the value of
research [40]. In view of the uncertainty, we consider a range of
costs per error from 1% to 100% of a $400,000 grant.
We consider the choice of ten judges to be optimal and from the
cost equation find that: Perror(10)vPerror(11)z(Cjudge=Cerror)
and Perror(10)vPerror(9){(Cjudge=Cerror). To find a reviewer’s
accuracy, we need a model of the decision-making process to see
how Perror changes with judge accuracy.
Grant reviews typically employ a sum rule rather than a majority
rule and use strict guidelines to set the range of judges’ scores [9].
Because of this we used a model like the one from Figure 2C.
Typically, grant reviews are a multi-stage process with alternating
rounds of scoring and discussion [9]. Here, we apply our analysis to
the first round of scoring before the reviewers discuss (‘‘prescores’’)
and treat the reviewers as independent [9]. In File S1, we also
consider models of dependency and multiple-stage processes.
For our Perror(njudge) function we construct a scenario with two
competing grants: A and B, where A is better than B. Each judge
scores the grants according to a unique normal distribution NAi
and NBi (where i represents judge i’s score). The means of NBi are
samples from a normal distribution (mean of 2 with a standard
deviation of 0.5) so each judge’s average score is different. As in
Figure 2C, the standard deviation of a judge’s score for both A and
B is a constant multiple of his/her mean score– 0.2 in this case.
This ensures that the judges have the same coefficient of variation
in their scores. The remaining term is the mean of NAi which
determines the overlap of NAi and NBi, and consequently the
extent to which a judge mistakenly scores B higher than A. For
simplicity, we assume that the mean for NAi is a constant ‘‘c’’ times
the mean of NBi, where cw1.
To determine the implied accuracy of the judges before the
discussion, we find the range of ‘‘c’’ values that give a Perror(10)
which meets the two criteria listed above. If the cost per error is
100% of the grant’s value, or $400,000, the implied judge
accuracy is 87–89%. If, on the other hand, the cost per error is
only 1% of the grant’s value, or $4,000, the implied judge accuracy
is 67–69%.
Discussion
Evaluation procedures are ubiquitous and great significance for
individuals and society may devolve from a single decision. An
important question in the designof any evaluationprocedure is how
many judges to consult. Previous work has approached this problem
through analyzing evaluation costs or accuracy [14,15,32–34].
Here, we link these two components to find the optimal number of
judges,balancing the cost ofa judgewith the cost ofmakinganerror
in evaluation. Through this analysis, we demonstrate that there
exists an inter-connectivity of the factors governing an evaluation
procedure. Decisions such as whether to use a majority rule or sum
rule or what type of scores judges can assign also affect the optimal
number of judges. Thus, as evaluation procedures evolve over time
so does the optimal number of judges.
We also found that paradoxically the optimal number of judges
may be higher in evaluations using more accurate judges. From
the cost analysis, better training of judges does not necessarily lead
to a decrease in the optimal number of judges. Since the cost
analysis is optimizing cost rather than accuracy, our result does not
contradict the Condorcet Jury Theorem that states that for a fixed
number of judges of equal accuracy, better training will always
lead to improved group accuracy.
Our main results are summarized in Figure 3C, which shows
the optimal number of judges, defined as the number of judges
resulting in minimal expected cost, as a function of judge accuracy
and (Cerror=Cjudge) using a majority rule evaluation scheme. For
judge accuracies near 50% or 100%, there is little benefit of
adding additional judges, so that the optimal number of judges is
1. For a fixed (Cerror=Cjudge), the optimal number of judges has a
single peak for an intermediate value of judge accuracies. For
example, for a (Cerror=Cjudge)~80 the maximal value for the
optimal number of judges is 9 for judge accuracy in the range
&60{70%. Although increasing the judge accuracy leads to a
reduction in the optimal number of judges, paradoxically,
decreasing the judge accuracy also leads to a reduction in the
optimal number of judges.
Our theory can also be used to make quantitative predictions.
Consider a granting institution that has a large variety of programs
with different funding levels. If we assume that optimal evaluation
procedures are being used, and that both the cost per judge and
judge accuracy remain constant, computations such as those in
Figure 2B predict the number of judges as a function of the size of
the grant.
While the computations presented in this paper used simple
models of evaluation procedures, our results should extend into
more complicated evaluation procedures. In File S1, we apply our
analysis to an example with judges of different accuracies who
make decisions dependently. Ultimately, the cost analysis relies on
the calculation of the probability of an error as a function of the
number of judges (the judge accuracy curve). As long as we have a
model of the decision-making process we can compute this curve
for a variety of evaluation methods and conditions.
There are limitations to our approach that would require a
more detailed and case-specific analysis. For example, if judges
have different costs associated then a more elaborate cost analysis
than the one presented here would need to be performed, assessing
the costs and probabilities of an error with different combinations
of judges. Our work also assumes that there is a model of the
evaluation procedure and its parameters can be estimated. Thus,
in grant reviews we assume that we know the procedures and can
obtain some measurements of evaluation accuracy. This may be
difficult in some situations– especially dependent decision-making
where some reviewers may have more sway over committee
members than others. Still, there is a body of work that attempts to
estimate accuracy in areas such as grant review and it is possible
for granting organizations to collect data necessary to build more
explicit models [9,14–16,19].
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estimate the cost per error and the cost per judge. In cases like
athletic competitions there is often a fixed fee for judges making
the cost of a judge apparent. In contrast, for grant reviews judges
are not usually remunerated monetarily and part of the cost of
judges might include the time lost to other pursuits [17,18]. Of
course, there are often benefits for judging that accrue such as
establishing ties with colleagues, editors, and grant administra-
tors. The cost per error can also be difficult to explicitly quantify.
For example, although, nominally the cost per error for a
research grant review is a product of the probability of failure and
the value of the grant, success in obtaining a grant may have
major personal ramifications in terms of career advancement and
monetary benefits such as patents or additional grants that might
accrue or not depending on successful completion of a project.
However, a major point of the current analysis is that there is an implied
range for (Cerror=Cjudge) that is set by the number of judges, Figure 3C.
This point should be appreciated by those who set evaluation
procedures.
The findings presented in this paper are particularly relevant in
the context of a recent review of NIH grant procedures [10] which
highlighted the need for more explicit criteria for grant evaluation,
reviewer training, and evaluation of reviewers. Although the NIH
report also focused on the need to adopt procedures that would
lessen the administrative burden, it also concluded (p. 78)
‘‘Engaging more reviewers per application and throughout the
review process will help to ensure review quality and consistency,
as would enhanced reviewer training.’’ However engaging more
reviewers may not be advantageous if the reviewer quality of
additional reviewers is inferior to a smaller, more expert panel,
Figure 1B [32–34]. Even if increasing the number of reviewers
increased the accuracy of the decision, it certainly increases the
administrative burden which is a type of cost.
The focus of this paper has been finding the balance between
accuracy and cost. By making explicit the relationships between
the evaluation accuracy, the cost per judge, and the cost per error,
the methods reported here should help policy-makers improve
decision-making procedures.
Methods
Computer code for Figures 1B, 2C, 2E, 3A, 3B, and 3C can be
found in File S1.
Judge Accuracy Curve with Inferior Judges
We can calculate the accuracy (Pa) of a panel that uses the
majority rule using equation 3 below. We assume that all judges
are equally accurate and have a probability p of choosing the right
option. The variable N is the number of judges in the panel (we
assume N is odd to avoid ties). The panel’s accuracy can also be
expressed as the ratio of an incomplete beta function and a beta
function.
Pa~
X N
k~
Nz1
2
N
k
  
pk(1{p)
N{k ð3Þ
When we add additional judges with a different accuracy, we
calculate the panel’s accuracy with equation 4 [32]. This
represents a mixing of two panels: N1 judges with accuracy p1
and N2 judges with p2 accuracy such that the total number of
judges is odd.
Pa~
X N1
k~0
N1
k
 !
pk
1(1{p1)
N1{k
X N2
j~
N1zN2z1
2
{k
N2
j
 !
p
j
2(1{p2)
N2{j
0
B B B B @
1
C C C C A
ð4Þ
Sum Rule vs. Majority Rule Methods
We first assume that there are two competitors A and B, where
A is better than B. These competitors are scored by a number of
different judges. An individual judge is not perfectly consistent and
will some times give the same performance different scores. To
account for this lack of precision, an individual judge’s scores for A
and B will be drawn from two different normal distributions Ai
and Bi (where i is an index for judge i). The mean of Ai will be
larger than the mean of Bi since A is better than B.
The amount of overlap between the Ai and Bi determines the
inaccuracy of the evaluation, quantifying how often B is
incorrectly given a higher score than A (judge ac-
curacy=1{
Ð ?
{? NAi(x)(
Ð ?
x NBi(s)ds)dx). This is a common
interpretation of scores in which if a judge gives the incorrect
option a higher score, then the judge is wrong. For simplicity, each
judge has the same accuracy, say 70%.
In addition to the distribution of a given judge’s scores for a
single competitor, different judges may assign scores for the same
competitor based around a different mean value. So any two
judges will have scoring distributions for A with different means.
To simulate the differences between judges, the mean score each
judge assigns option B is randomly drawn from a tight or broad
distribution, modeled by a normal or a log normal distribution,
respectively. Thus, while an individual judge scores options A and
B according to normal distributions Ai and Bi, the mean of Bi is
picked from either a normal or lognormal distribution. We then
determine the mean of that judge’s Ai scoring distribution by
multiplying the mean of Bi by a fixed constant 1.16 (the same for
all judges throughout the simulation, calculated so the judges are
70% accurate). For simplicity, we also fix the the coefficient of
variation for Ai to be the same as Bi and equal to 0.2.
The total accuracy of a panel of judges in these simulations
depends on the number of judges and whether their mean scores
come from a tight or broad distribution. Similar to figure skating,
the tight distribution of judges’ scores for the mean of Bi has a
mean 7 and standard deviation .7 (used in Figure 2C). The log
normal distribution (used in Figure 2E) has mean 700 and
standard deviation 1400. Each data point represents the mean
accuracy from 100,000 different samples of judges’ scores (100,000
panels of judges).
Supporting Information
File S1 This supplementary material, referred to in the text as
File S1, includes a glossary, a worked example with added
complexity, and computer code for the figures.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012642.s001 (0.15 MB
PDF)
Figure S1 The vertical axis is the constant added to ‘‘c’’ for
every judge, thus further separating the scoring distributions for
the grants and improving each judge’s accuracy. The horizontal
axis is the cost ratio, (cost per error)/ (cost per judge). The colored
Calculus Committee Composition
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paper, there is a single peaked surface, and thus the paradox is
present.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0012642.s002 (0.15 MB TIF)
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